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In Search of the Welcome Mat: The Scope of Statutory Federal
Question Jurisdiction After Grable & Sons Metal Products,
Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing
For nearly eighty-five years, the Supreme Court has given
federal courts express authority to exercise federal question
jurisdiction' over state-law claims involving embedded issues of
federal law.' Over this period, however, the Court has not articulated
a single, clear test for determining when jurisdiction over such hybrid
claims is proper.3 After the Court's 1986 decision in Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson,4 lower courts frequently stated
that federal question jurisdiction would lie over hybrid claims only
where Congress intended to create a private, federal remedy under
the statute or regulation at issue.5
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) provides the authority for federal question jurisdiction in
the district courts: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
2. These state-federal hybrid claims arise when a plaintiff's complaint alleges a state-
law cause of action but lists as an element of that cause of action a violation of a federal
statute or the U.S. Constitution. The seminal case is Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust
Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). In Smith, a shareholder of a state bank filed suit to prevent the
bank from investing in federal farm loan bonds, alleging that the act creating the bonds
was unconstitutional. Id. at 195. The Supreme Court found federal question jurisdiction
proper, setting forth the broad rule that where a plaintiff's "right to relief depends upon
the construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the United States ... the
District Court has jurisdiction" over the claim. Id. at 199. For a discussion of the history
of Supreme Court decisions in this area, see Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble
with Statutory Federal Question Doctrine After Merrell Dow, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1477, 1502-
20(1991).
3. See, e.g., Kenneth Lee Marshall, Note, Understanding Merrell Dow: Federal
Question Jurisdiction for State-Federal Hybrid Cases, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 219, 219 (1999)
(noting that "the Court has yet to agree on a unifying principle" for gauging the scope of
federal question jurisdiction).
4. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
5. See Rains v. Criterion Sys., 80 F.3d 339, 347 n.10 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that
Merrell Dow "established a bright line rule that where the federal law that serves as an
element of the state law claim does not create a private right of action," federal question
jurisdiction does not exist); Seinfeld v. Austen, 39 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[I1f
federal law does not provide a private right of action, then a state law action based on its
violation perforce does not raise a 'substantial' federal question." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 152 (4th Cir.
1994) (stating that "under Merrell Dow, if a federal law does not create a private right of
action, a state law action based upon its violation does not raise a 'substantial' federal
question" sufficient to confer jurisdiction); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1169 (5th
Cir. 1988) (holding that the "minimum requirement" of Merrell Dow is "that the federal
statutes involved provide a private, federal remedy"); Miller v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 834
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The most recent Supreme Court decision in this area, Grable &
Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing,6
purports to "resolve a split within the Courts of Appeals on whether
Merrell Dow ... always requires a federal cause of action as a
condition for exercising federal-question jurisdiction."7 Holding that
the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over a state-law quiet
title claim where the embedded issue of federal tax law did not create
a private, federal remedy, the Grable Court made clear that a federal
cause of action is not always necessary for the exercise of federal
question jurisdiction.8
Unfortunately, the scope of federal jurisdiction over hybrid
claims remains uncertain, in part because the Grable Court added a
new element-that jurisdiction over a particular claim must not
disturb any congressionally intended balance of state and federal
judicial power 9-to the existing (though never clearly defined) federal
interest test.1° While the Court's decision to abandon Merrell Dow's
misleading remedy-focused test is a clear step forward in federal
question jurisprudence, the references to congressional intent in the
new two-prong Grable test add little to the existing inquiry and will
likely only confuse lower courts if taken literally. Fortunately,
however, the Court's analysis in Grable offers an alternative to this
restrictive reading of the two-prong test. In reconciling its decision
with the holding in Merrell Dow, the Grable Court actually applied a
more pragmatic, two-part balancing test." This balancing test, which
weighs the federal interest in providing a forum in a particular case
against the risk of burdening the federal docket with an enormous
influx of similar cases, offers a method that lower courts can follow to
produce consistent jurisdictional results in hybrid cases.
F.2d 556, 562 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting that under Merrell Dow, "a finding of an express or
implied private right of action is a necessary but not a sufficient indication that the federal
question is a substantial one"); see also Alleva, supra note 2, at 1532-38 (discussing lower
court decisions applying Merrell Dow).
6. 125 S. Ct. 2363 (2005). Throughout the remainder of this Recent Development,
the Supreme Court Reporter is used for citations to Grable because pinpoint citations to
the United States Reports were unavailable at the time of publication.
7. Id. at 2366.
8. See id. (affirming the lower court's exercise of jurisdiction despite absence of a
federal cause of action).
9. See id. at 2368.
10. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing federal interest test); see
also infra notes 58-71 and accompanying text (elaborating on and applying federal interest
test).
11. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing test the
Court employed in reconciling Grable and Merrell Dow).
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This Recent Development first examines the holdings of Grable
and Merrell Dow and discusses the Court's conclusion that a federal
remedy is not always necessary to justify federal question jurisdiction
over hybrid claims. Next, this Recent Development examines the
potential confusion caused by the two-prong test articulated by the
Grable Court. This test separates the analysis of the significance of
the federal issue raised by the plaintiff's complaint from the analysis
of congressional intent regarding the scope of federal jurisdiction
generally. After concluding that Congress's jurisdictional intent is
best ascertained on a case-by-case basis by analyzing the federal
interest in providing a forum to adjudicate the federal issue
embedded in the plaintiffs complaint, the analysis turns to the
Court's reliance on pragmatic factors-especially potential burdens
on the federal docket-in the Grable decision. Ultimately, this
Recent Development concludes that the balancing test the Court
applied in reconciling Grable and Merrell Dow-a test that weighs the
significance of the federal interest in providing a forum against the
potential burden on the federal docket imposed by the exercise of
jurisdiction-renders the Court's most difficult prior cases consistent
with one another and should be the test applied in future cases.
At its core, Merrell Dow was a state-law products liability case.12
The plaintiffs filed suit in an Ohio state court, alleging that Bendectin,
a drug manufactured by Merrell Dow, had caused severe birth
defects. 3 In addition to theories of negligence, breach of warranty,
strict liability, fraud, and gross negligence, the Merrell Dow plaintiffs'
complaint alleged a violation of the branding provisions of the federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA").14 According to the
plaintiffs, a violation of the FDCA would create a "rebuttable
presumption of negligence" under Ohio law.'5 Merrell Dow removed
the suit to federal district court on grounds that the alleged FDCA
violation constituted a cause of action "arising under the laws of the
United States." 6 The district court subsequently dismissed the case
12. See Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 805 (1986) (noting that
each plaintiff's complaint "alleged that a child was born with multiple deformities as a
result of the mother's ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy").
13. Id. Litigation over birth defects allegedly caused by Bendectin was widespread in
the 1980s. See generally Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the
Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1992) (discussing the history of Bendectin
litigation). As of 1992, plaintiffs had filed over 2,100 Bendectin claims against Merrell
Dow. Id. at 319.
14. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805-06.
15. Id. at 806.
16. Id.
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on forum non conveniens grounds. 7 The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit found removal improper, and the Supreme Court
affirmed.1
8
Although the Supreme Court in Merrell Dow extolled the virtues
of "sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial power,
and the federal system" in jurisdictional decisions at "the outer
reaches of § 1331,"' 19 its holding was essentially mechanistic: because
the FDCA did not provide a private remedy for violations of its
branding requirements, federal question jurisdiction did not lie over
the plaintiffs' claims that Merrell Dow violated the FDCA.2 ° This
holding drew significant criticism for its apparent conflation of
Congress's remedial and jurisdictional intents,2  and caused
considerable confusion among lower federal courts struggling to
decide whether Merrell Dow meant that a federal remedy is always
necessary in order to sustain federal question jurisdiction.2 2  This
17. Id. The plaintiffs in Merrell Dow were residents of Canada and Scotland. Id. at
805. The Court noted the diversity of citizenship (Merrell Dow's principal place of
business was in Ohio) but correctly pointed out that because plaintiffs had filed suit in
Merrell Dow's home state, removal on diversity grounds would not be proper under 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b). See id. at 806 n.1. Section 1441(b) provides that where jurisdiction is not
grounded on a federal question, a state-court action is "removable only if none of the
parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
which such action is brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000).
18. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 807.
19. Id. at 810.
20. See id. at 814 (holding that the absence of a federal remedy is "tantamount to a
congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an
element of a state cause of action is insufficiently 'substantial' to confer federal-question
jurisdiction").
21. See, e.g., Alleva, supra note 2, at 1484-85 (arguing that the emphasis on the
absence of a federal remedy in Merrell Dow "amounts to a virtual substitution of the
remedial for the jurisdictional inquiry"); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of
Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian
Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1790 (1992) (arguing that the Merrell Dow Court
"attempted to discern congressional intent for the wrong statute or, if the right statute, the
wrong question"). Justice Brennan, dissenting in Merrell Dow, made this same point:
Why should the fact that Congress chose not to create a private federal remedy
mean that Congress would not want there to be federal jurisdiction to adjudicate a
state claim that imposes liability for violating the federal law? Clearly, the
decision not to provide a private federal remedy should not affect federal
jurisdiction unless the reasons Congress withholds a federal remedy are also
reasons for withholding federal jurisdiction.
Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 825 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2366
(2005) (noting a split among circuits over the meaning of Merrell Dow); see also Note, Mr.
Smith Goes to Federal Court: Federal Question Jurisdiction over State Law Claims Post-
Merrell Dow, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2272, 2279-80 (2002) (noting that uncertainty among
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confusion prompted the Grable Court to revisit the scope of § 1331
jurisdiction nearly twenty years after Merrell Dow.
In Grable, the plaintiff, Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc., filed
a state-law quiet title action, in Michigan state court seeking to
recover real property sold five years earlier by the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") to satisfy Grable's tax debt.23 The crux of Grable's
claim was that the IRS failed to provide adequate notice of seizure as
required by federal law.24 The parties agreed that Grable received
actual notice by certified mail, but Grable argued that the statute
required personal service. The defendant removed the case to
federal court, contending that the parties' dispute over the tax statute
presented a federal question.26 Both the District Court for the
Western District of Michigan and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit decided the substantive issue-whether the IRS complied with
the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code-against Grable,
holding that "although [the Code] by its terms required personal
service, substantial compliance with the statute was enough."27 The
Supreme Court, granting certiorari on the jurisdictional issue only,
affirmed the lower courts' exercise of § 1331 jurisdiction. 8
Although the statute at issue clearly imposed a duty on the IRS,
federal tax law does not provide for quiet title actions such as that
brought by Grable,29 and thus the Court in Grable was forced to
confront its apparently contrary holding in Merrell Dow. Ultimately,
the Court held that Merrell Dow's federal remedy requirement was
no requirement at all-at least not in every case:
circuit courts may have led to increased reversal rates on jurisdictional grounds in hybrid
cases).
23. Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2366.
24. Id. The statute at issue, 26 U.S.C. § 6335(a) (2000), requires the IRS to provide
"notice in writing ... to the owner of the property" prior to seizure.
25. Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2366.
26. Id.
27. Id. The district court alluded to the jurisdictional issue only in passing, see Grable
& Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 694, 695 (W.D.
Mich. 2002) (noting that Darue removed the case to federal court by "properly contending
that adjudication of [Grable's] claim necessarily turns on a proposition of federal law"),
while the Sixth Circuit decided the jurisdictional question on the basis of a three-part test,
see Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., Inc., 377 F.3d 592, 595-96
(6th Cir. 2004). Under the Sixth Circuit's three-part test, federal question jurisdiction
exists over hybrid claims "if the plaintiff asserts a federal right that 1) involves a
substantial question of federal law; 2) is framed in terms of state law; and 3) requires
interpretation of federal law to resolve the case." Id. at 595.
28. Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2366.
29. See id. at 2369 (noting that "federal law provides for no quiet title action that
could be brought against Darue").
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Merrell Dow should be read in its entirety as treating the
absence of a federal private right of action as evidence relevant
to, but not dispositive of, the "sensitive judgments about
congressional intent" that § 1331 requires .... The Court [in
Merrell Dow] saw the missing cause of action not as a missing
federal door key, always required, but as a missing welcome
mat, required in the circumstances, when exercising federal
jurisdiction over a state misbranding action would have
attracted a horde of original filings and removal cases raising
other state claims with embedded federal issues."
In Grable, then, the Court definitively held that a federal cause of
action is not always required to establish federal question jurisdiction
over state-law claims.31
The Court's unanimous decision that Merrell Dow does not
require the existence of a federal remedy as a condition of exercising
§ 1331 jurisdiction may receive the bulk of attention (and praise)
from practitioners and scholars, but the Grable decision is equally
notable for the broader jurisdictional rule it sets forth. After
summarizing the major cases dealing with federal question
jurisdiction over hybrid claims, the Court noted that none of these
prior decisions had "stat[ed] a 'single, precise, all-embracing' test for
jurisdiction over federal issues embedded in state-law claims between
nondiverse parties. ' 3  Nevertheless, the Court formulated a two-
prong test to decide the § 1331 question in hybrid cases. According to
the test articulated in Grable, federal question jurisdiction over state-
law claims incorporating federal issues is proper where (1) the claim
"necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and
substantial," and (2) adjudicating the claim in federal court will not
"disturb[] any congressionally approved balance of federal and state
judicial responsibilities. '33 Unfortunately, the second prong of this
30. Id. at 2370.
31. It appears, though, that district courts may be free to find the absence of a federal
cause of action as dispositive in certain cases-cases in which the potential burden on the
federal docket associated with exercising jurisdiction over a class of similar claims requires
the "welcome mat" of a federal cause of action. See id.
32. Id. at 2368 (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 821
(1988) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
33. Id. The Second Circuit describes the Grable standard as a three-prong test. See
Broder v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 418 F.3d 187, 196 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that the
complaint "satisfie[d] all three prongs of the Grable test"). The first prong of the test as
described by the Second Circuit-that "the claims 'necessarily raise [the] stated federal
issue,' " id. at 195 (alteration in original)-is essentially the "well-pleaded complaint" rule.
See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) ("[A] suit arises
under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's statement of
2006] 1399
1400 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84
test, if treated as a direction to find congressional intent regarding the
scope of federal question jurisdiction generally,34 will likely confuse
the lower courts. This is not the only possible reading of the Grable
test, and the Court's reconciliation of its holdings in Grable and
Merrell Dow does not demand this reading." Nevertheless, this
potential for confusion merits some discussion.
The difficulty with the two-part test stated in Grable arises from
the fact that it separates the analysis of the significance of the federal
issue in dispute from the analysis of congressional intent with respect
to the scope of federal question jurisdiction. The Merrell Dow Court
viewed the question of Congress's jurisdictional intent as inseparable
from the question of the significance of the federal issue in dispute.
In that case, the absence of a federal remedy under the FDCA was
"tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a
claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of
action is insufficiently 'substantial' to confer federal-question
jurisdiction."36  Commentators sometimes refer to this approach-
deciding the § 1331 question by reference to the significance of the
his own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution."); see
also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION 276-82 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing
the well-pleaded complaint rule). For simplicity and conciseness, this Recent
Development assumes satisfaction of the well-pleaded complaint rule, as the question of
whether an embedded federal issue is sufficient to establish federal question jurisdiction
will arise only when the federal issue appears in the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint. See
Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) ("[T]he question
whether a claim 'arises under' federal law must be determined by reference to the 'well-
pleaded complaint.' ").
34. See Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2367 (stating that federal jurisdiction must be "consistent
with congressional judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal
courts"). Notably, while the Court cited several decisions providing direct authority for
the substantial federal issue prong of the test, the congressional intent prong was
introduced without clear authority from the earlier cases. See id. In support of this second
prong, the Court quoted a passage from Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California, 463 U.S. 1 (1983), stating that "the
appropriateness of a federal forum to hear an embedded issue could be evaluated only
after considering the 'welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal and state
authority and the proper management of the federal judicial system.' " Grable, 125 S. Ct.
at 2367 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8). The Court also cited the Merrell Dow
opinion, see id. at 2368 (citing Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810), where congressional intent
appears as an element of a decidedly ambiguous principle governing § 1331 jurisprudence:
"We have consistently emphasized that, in exploring the outer reaches of § 1331,
determinations about federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about congressional
intent, judicial power, and the federal system." Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810.
35. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's use of a
balancing test in reconciling Grable and Merrell Dow).
36. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 (emphasis added).
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federal issue at stake-as the "federal interest test."37  The Grable
Court's bifurcation of the existing, though certainly contested,38
federal interest test may result in continued confusion in the lower
courts, which have received little guidance in how to ascertain this
separate congressional intent.
Two instances of congressional intent have potential relevance in
any decision to exercise the federal jurisdiction conferred by § 1331:
(1) Congress's intent in enacting the general grant of federal question
jurisdiction in § 1331 and (2) its intent in enacting the particular
statute at issue in the case at bar.39 The two-prong Grable test
corresponds to the two relevant instances of congressional intent: the
significance of the federal issue prong implicates Congress's intent in
enacting the substantive statute, while the balance of state and federal
judicial authority prong implicates Congress's intent in enacting
§ 1331. 40 Thus, the Court's decision in Grable to separate the
significance of the embedded federal issue from the analysis of
congressional intent in this manner suggests that the relevant intent in
37. See, e.g., Note, supra note 22, at 2278 (referring to the rule of Merrell Dow as "the
federal interest test"). Although the Grable Court noted that there has never been a
single, universally applicable test for jurisdiction over hybrid claims, see Grable, 125 S. Ct.
at 2368, the Court has consistently noted the importance of the significance of the federal
issue at stake, see Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 n.12 (citing with approval the theory that
the Court's "§ 1331 decisions can best be understood as an evaluation of the nature of the
federal interest at stake"); see also Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13 (noting that § 1331
jurisdiction over state-law claims is "unavailable unless it appears that some substantial,
disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state
claims" (emphasis added)); Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 118 (1936) (suggesting
that the jurisdictional inquiry in close cases requires "a selective process which picks the
substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones aside").
38. See, e.g., Note, supra note 22 at 2278-80 (criticizing the federal interest test as
overly subjective).
39. Cf William V. Luneberg, Nonoriginalist Interpretation-A Comment on Federal
Question Jurisdiction and Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 48 U. PITr. L.
REV. 757, 763-64 (1987) (discussing the examination of Congress's substantive and
jurisdictional intentions in Merrell Dow). The attempt to separate Congress's
jurisdictional intent in this manner arguably imposes an artificial formalism that will lead
to a failure to properly ascertain congressional intent at all. Indeed, the Grable Court may
have intended some sort of holistic interpretation of congressional intent; unfortunately,
the Court gave no clear direction on how to apply this second prong of the test. This
Recent Development does not advocate a particular theory of statutory interpretation.
However, separating Congress's intent in this manner is a useful analytic tool for
examining the implications of Grable's introduction of a second prong into the § 1331
analysis. For an engaging critique of the theory that courts can ascertain a legislature's
"original intent," see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 13-47 (1994).
40. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (setting forth the two-prong Grable
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the second prong of the Grable test is Congress's intent in enacting
§ 1331.
This seems to be a sound theoretical choice: the scope of
jurisdiction created by statute should be determined by reference to
the jurisdiction-creating statute.4' In practice, however, this
instruction will provide courts with very little guidance. As an initial
matter, there is no doubt that the Congress adopting the first federal
question statute42 did not consider the specific possibility of whether
federal question jurisdiction should lie over state-law claims
implicating provisions of substantive federal laws that did not yet
exist.4 3 Furthermore, any attempt to ascertain Congress's intent in
§ 1331 through a "plain meaning" approach' is immediately
stonewalled by the ambiguous "arising under" language of § 1331. 4s
This ambiguity is exacerbated by the fact that the statute repeats the
41. Some commentators have noted that it is unlikely that Congress would have any
intent with respect to the scope of federal question jurisdiction when enacting a statute
that is silent on the matter. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 21, at 1790-91 (arguing that the
Court in Merrell Dow "attempted to discern congressional intent for the wrong statute").
42. The federal question statute was passed in the Judiciary Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 470
(1875). MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION
OF JUDICIAL POWER, 83 n.4 (2d ed. 1990). Prior to 1875, "Congress granted original
federal-question jurisdiction briefly in the Midnight Judges Act, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 92
(1801), which was repealed in 1802, Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132." Merrell
Dow, 478 U.S. at 826 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. See Luneberg, supra note 39, at 763 ("[I]t is unlikely that Congress in 1875 thought
in a specific or general way about the type of case presented.., in Thompson and formed
an intent one way or the other.").
44. See NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46:01 (6th ed. 2000) (discussing the "plain meaning" rule); see also
REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 229-33
(1975) (discussing and criticizing the "plain meaning" rule). "The plain meaning rule has
many formulations, but its essential aspect is a denial of the need to 'interpret'
unambiguous language." Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-
Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1299, 1299 (1975).
45. See supra note 1 (quoting § 1331). Justice Holmes may have been attempting a
"plain meaning" approach in American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S.
257 (1916), when he wrote that "[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of
action." Id. at 260. As Professor Cohen points out, however, Justice Holmes's reasoning
could have easily led to the opposite result in American Well Works itself. See William
Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise "Directly" Under
Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 898 (1967). Although the Grable Court rejected the
American Well Works test, see Grable Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct.
2363, 2369-70 (2005), Justice Thomas's concurrence in Grable suggests the possibility that
the Holmes formulation has life left in it yet, see id. at 2372 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(suggesting a willingness to overrule prior cases in favor of the "clear" American Well
Works rule).
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language of the constitutional grant of federal question jurisdiction,'
which courts have consistently interpreted as providing broader
jurisdiction than § 1331 itself.47
Reference to legislative history is also of little help. The limited
record surviving from the enactment of § 1331's predecessor statute48
suggests that the drafters of the federal question statute intended to
confer the full authority of the constitutional grant of federal question
jurisdiction.49 Indeed, one of the drafters of the bill that became
§ 1331 said in colloquy that the federal question statute, unlike
previous jurisdictional statutes, "gives precisely the power which the
Constitution confers-nothing more, nothing less."5  This conflict
between the apparent intent of the Congress that passed what is now
§ 1331 and the courts' subsequent treatment of the statute, combined
with the ambiguity of the statute's language, suggests that a
traditional analysis of Congress's intent in enacting § 1331 will likely
46. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority...." (emphasis added)).
47. See, e.g., Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 807 ("[W]e have long construed the statutory
grant of federal-question jurisdiction as conferring a more limited power [than the
constitutional grant]."); see also Ray Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question," 16
TUL. L. REV. 362, 364 (1942) (noting that courts have given the words "arising under"
different meanings-"one for the Constitution, another for the statute"). The
constitutional meaning of the "arising under" phrase can be found in Osborn v. Bank of
the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), in which Chief Justice Marshall wrote that
a case arises under federal law whenever a federal question "forms an ingredient of the
original cause ... although other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it." Id. at
822. Even scholars advocating broad grants of federal jurisdiction find the Osborn rule
untenable as a test for the scope of statutory federal question jurisdiction. See REDISH,
supra note 42, at 94.
48. See supra note 42 (discussing the Judiciary Act of 1875).
49. See Forrester, supra note 47, at 374-77 (discussing congressional debates and
contemporary writing on the Judiciary Act of 1875).
50. Id. at 375 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 2 CONG. REc. 4986-87 (1874) (statement
of Sen. Carpenter)). Arguably, Congress's continued inaction-the relevant "arising
under" language has not changed since the enactment of the original 1875 statute,
compare Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470 (1875), with 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2000)-in the face of decisions interpreting § 1331 more narrowly than the Article III
grant of federal question jurisdiction suggests that Congress has accepted the distinction in
the scope of statutory and constitutional federal question jurisdiction. Cf HOWARD P.
FINK ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: CASES AND MATERIALS 295
(1996) (suggesting that the well-pleaded complaint rule is firmly entrenched because of
Congress's disinclination to change the rule by statute). Even assuming the validity of this
ratification argument, the only direct evidence of congressional intent with regard to the
scope of statutory federal question jurisdiction is ambiguous at best and contradictory at
worst. See Forrester, supra note 47, at 374 (noting the conflict between the apparent
intent of the Congress of 1875 and the courts' interpretation of the federal question
statute).
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do little more than frustrate lower courts faced with the question of
whether to exercise federal question jurisdiction over hybrid claims.
The Grable opinion compounds this confusion by sending mixed
messages on where courts should look for congressional intent. In
discussing the role that the absence of a federal remedy under the
FDCA played in the Merrell Dow decision, the Grable Court noted
that the "primary importance [of the absence of a federal remedy]
emerged when the Court treated the combination of no federal cause
of action and no preemption of state remedies for misbranding as an
important clue to Congress's conception of the scope of jurisdiction to
be exercised under § 1331. "51 Thus, the Grable Court seems to agree
with-or at least acquiesce in-the Merrell Dow Court's conclusion
that Congress's decisions in enacting the FDCA indicated its intent
with respect to a wholly different statute: § 1331.52 This acquiescence
creates some problems with the structure of the two-prong Grable
test.
The first prong, requiring a substantial federal issue, 3 seems to
be the proper home for analysis of Congress's intent with respect to
the embedded federal issue. The second prong, requiring that an
exercise of jurisdiction comports with Congress's intended "division
of labor between state and federal courts,""4 is styled as an
examination of what Congress intended to be the general parameters
of federal question jurisdiction, which should be found in § 1331.11
Yet the Court accepts that this second half of the inquiry can proceed
from an analysis of the substantive statute embedded in the plaintiff's
claim. 6 A more honest articulation of the federal question test would
admit that Congress has, by no means, created a bright line
demarcating the "sound division of labor between state and federal
51. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2370
(2005).
52. The Grable Court's apparent acquiescence in the Merrell Dow theory of
congressional intent-that Congress's remedial intent is a valid proxy for its jurisdictional
intent-leaves open the possibility that lower courts will continue to find the absence of a
federal remedy to be dispositive in the jurisdictional inquiry, in spite of the Court's
instructions to the contrary. See id. at 2370 (describing the presence or absence of a
federal remedy as "evidence relevant to, but not dispositive of" Congress's jurisdictional
intent).
53. See id. at 2367.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 2370 (stating that the "primary importance" of the absence of a federal
remedy in Merrell Dow was in providing a "clue to Congress's conception of the scope of
jurisdiction to be exercised under § 1331").
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courts governing the application of § 1331" 7 and that jurisdictional
decisions in particular cases must follow from the nature of the
particular federal interest at stake.
This federal interest analysis does not require courts to assess the
relative importance of federal statutes, but rather to assess the federal
interest in adjudicating particular disputes in federal court. This
assessment should follow from the relationship of the particular
federal issue raised by the plaintiff's complaint to the potential
advantages provided by a federal forum. 8  One commentator
describes these advantages as including "(1) an expertise in discerning
and interpreting federal interests, (2) a sympathetic, but respectful,
national perspective, (3) the potential for uniform interpretation of
federal law, and (4) the impartiality and confidence afforded by
independence.'59 The facts of Grable and Merrell Dow show that the
federal interest in providing these advantages for the disputes in each
case was greater in the context of Grable than in Merrell Dow.
Interpretations of the FDCA provisions at issue in Merrell Dow
primarily affect private parties-manufacturers and distributors of
food, drugs, and cosmetics-subject to the statute's branding rules.'
While the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") has primary
responsibility for enforcing the FDCA, 1 the parties most affected by
the FDCA will always be private parties whose rights are altered by
the FDCA's provisions allowing for injunctions,62 criminal penalties
57. Id. at 2367. It has become a truism in federal court cases and scholarly literature
that bright-line rules of general applicability cannot capably comprehend the proper scope
of federal question jurisdiction. See id. at 2368 (noting that the Court has refrained from
stating a single, all-encompassing test for jurisdiction over hybrid claims); Merrell Dow
Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986) (stating that courts have a "'duty to
reject treating [jurisdictional] statutes as a wooden set of self-sufficient words' " (quoting
Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959)); Cohen, supra note 45,
at 907 ("What is surprising is the continuing belief that there is, or should be, a single, all-
purpose, neutral analytical concept which marks out federal question jurisdiction.").
58. See Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2367 ("[Flederal jurisdiction demands not only a
contested federal issue, but a substantial one, indicating a serious federal interest in
claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.").
59. Alleva, supra note 2, at 1495-96; see also Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2367 (describing the
advantages of a federal forum as "experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity ... on
federal issues"); AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 164-68 (1969) (discussing advantages similar to those
listed by Professor Alleva as justifications for federal question jurisdiction).
60. The FDCA prohibits the introduction, delivery, or receipt of "adulterated or
misbranded" drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a)-(c) (2000).
61. See id § 393 (creating the FDA and establishing its general mission); Merrell Dow,
478 U.S. at 830 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. § 332(a).
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including fines and imprisonment, 63 and seizure of goods.6' In stark
contrast, the notice of seizure requirement in the statute at issue in
Grable directly affects the federal government's ability to collect
revenue by prescribing the procedure the IRS must follow in
enforcing tax liens.65 Unlike the FDCA, which prescribes duties of
private parties, the tax provision at issue in Grable imposes a duty on
an arm of the federal government.66 In the sense that resolution of
the federal issue raised by the plaintiffs' complaint could affect
federal interests, the federal issue at stake in Grable was much more
significant than the issue at stake in Merrell Dow. 67
While the potential for uniform interpretation may support the
exercise of jurisdiction in both cases,68 over-reliance on the uniformity
factor would support the expansion of federal jurisdiction
unnecessarily, as any issue of federal law, no matter how minor, might
conceivably benefit from the potential for uniform interpretation in
the federal courts.69 Given the government's greater interest in the
63. See id. § 333(a).
64. See id. § 334(a)-(b).
65. See 26 U.S.C. § 6335(a); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg.,
125 S. Ct. 2363, 2368 (2005).
66. See Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2368.
67. Both the tax statute at issue in Grable and the FDCA provisions at issue in Merrell
Dow are, arguably, part of legislative schemes that permit the government to punish
citizens for noncompliance with statutory duties. The tax code permits the government to
seize citizens' property for failure to pay taxes, see 26 U.S.C. § 6331, and the FDCA
permits the government to seize goods and impose fines for citizens' violations of branding
requirements, see 21 U.S.C. § 334 (seizure); id. § 333 (fines). Nevertheless, the federal
interest in the particular section of tax code at issue in Grable was greater than the federal
interest in the FDCA misbranding provisions at issue in Merrell Dow because the notice of
seizure requirements impose a duty on the government itself that effectively limits its
ability to collect revenue. See 26 U.S.C. § 6335; Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2368.
68. Numerous state courts adjudicating tort claims involving the FDCA provisions at
issue in Merrell Dow could, in theory, produce conflicting precedents among the states on
the meaning of manufacturers' duties under the FDCA, just as numerous state courts
adjudicating quiet title claims involving the notice-of-tax-seizure provision at issue in
Grable could produce conflicting precedents among the states on the procedure the IRS
must follow in executing its right to seize property from delinquent taxpayers. Of course,
the same potential for conflicting precedent exists in the federal system in the form of
conflicts among the circuits, leading Professor Alleva to note that "the uniformity goal for
the lower courts is often more aspirational than achievable." Alleva, supra note 2, at 1497
n.55.
69. See REDISH, supra note 42, at 101 (noting that "Congress may have a legitimate
interest in preventing precedential confusion caused by the dramatic increase in the
number of interpreting courts" if cases like Merrell Dow are remanded to state courts).
Furthermore, the possibility of Supreme Court review of state court decisions limits the
persuasiveness of this factor in the jurisdictional inquiry. See Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 816 (1986) (noting that concerns for uniformity of interpretation
are "considerably mitigated by the fact that, even if there is no original district court
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outcome of litigation involving a duty of the IRS as compared to
litigation involving duties of private parties, the federal interest in
providing the expertise found in a federal forum appears stronger in
Grable than in Merrell Dow. The relative importance of providing a
federal forum in Grable as opposed to Merrell Dow becomes even
clearer when one considers the advantages of impartiality and
sympathy for national issues. In cases involving provisions of the tax
code, the risk arises that state-court judges brought to the bench by
election and not insulated from the political process by life tenure and
the insurance of a non-declining salary would decide cases such as
Grable in favor of constituent taxpayers.7"
It appears, then, that the outcomes of Merrell Dow and Grable
can be reconciled simply by reference to the significance of the
federal issues at stake in the two cases.71 The Court in Grable relied
in large part on the federal interest in providing a forum for
adjudication of tax-related matters to justify the exercise of federal
jurisdiction.72 In reconciling its decision with the holding of Merrell
Dow, however, the Court went one step further and noted that
"exercising federal jurisdiction over a state misbranding action [in
Merrell Dow] would have attracted a horde of original filings and
removal cases raising other state claims with embedded federal
issues."73  The Court saw the exercise of jurisdiction in Grable as
unlikely to overwhelm the federal courts because "it is the rare state
quiet title action that involves contested issues of federal law."74 The
jurisdiction for these kinds of action, [the Supreme] Court retains power to review the
decision of a federal issue in a state cause of action"). One commentator has suggested
that the federal question analysis should include consideration of the relative efficiency of
appellate versus original jurisdiction in achieving the desired uniformity of interpretation.
See Marshall, supra note 3, at 241.
70. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (stating that federal judges "shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office"), with
RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM, 38-39 (1996)
(noting that "in most states all or most state judges are elected rather than appointed").
Admittedly, the dispute in Grable was between two private parties, but the outcome of the
dispute hinged on the Court's interpretation of the IRS's duty to notify taxpayers of its
enforcement action, thus pitting the interests of a taxpayer against the interests of the IRS.
See Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2368.
71. A similar analysis is sufficient to reconcile two pre-Merrell Dow cases-Smith v.
Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921) and Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Railway Co., 291 U.S. 205 (1934)-long thought to be irreconcilable. See Merrell Dow,
478 U.S. at 814 n.12 ("[T]he difference in results [in Smith and Moore] can be seen as
manifestations of the differences in the nature of the federal issues at stake.").
72. See Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2368.
73. Id. at 2370.
74. Id. at 2371.
2006] 1407
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Grable Court was therefore clearly concerned with how a grant of
federal jurisdiction to a particular class of hybrid claims would affect
the caseload of the lower federal courts.75
This reconciliation of Grable and Merrell Dow is best viewed as a
balancing test wherein the Court weighs the federal interest in
providing a forum against the competing interest in avoiding
excessive burdens on the federal docket.76 Lower courts may well see
this balancing analysis as the appropriate application of Grable,
ignoring the problematic two-prong test discussed earlier in this
Recent Development.77 One might also argue that if the Court's
references to congressional intent regarding the "division of labor
between state and federal courts"78 are seen as a direction to consider
the effect of a jurisdictional decision on the federal docket, then the
two-prong test articulated and the balancing test applied in Grable
are consistent.79 Either way, the pragmatically oriented balancing test
is the more useful of the two and finds strong support in the history of
federal question jurisprudence, as the following discussion illustrates.
Concern for the burden on federal courts caused by an increasing
caseload is by no means new. Some commentators have suggested
that the Supreme Court's 1900 decision in Shoshone Mining Co. v.
Rutter"° was driven by "concern[s] with the volume of litigation which
a contrary decision would have loosed upon federal trial courts
overburdened by the expansion of jurisdiction caused by the Judiciary
75. See id.
76. Professor David Shapiro suggested such a balancing test twenty years prior to
Grable. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 570
(1985) (arguing that the outcomes in hybrid claim cases "may be better understood if
viewed in terms of the federal interest at stake and the effect on the federal docket"). The
relevance of the docket-load factor has been prominent in some early decisions from
lower courts applying Grable. Compare Broder v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 418 F.3d 187,
196 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding § 1331 jurisdiction over the plaintiff's hybrid claim proper
under Grable because similar suits "are particularly unlikely to recur"), with Sheridan v.
New Vista, L.L.C., No. 1:05-CV-428, 2005 WL 2090898, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 30, 2005)
(finding § 1331 jurisdiction improper because exercising jurisdiction in the instant case
would have made it possible to invoke federal question jurisdiction over "fairly routine
state law malpractice claims").
77. See supra notes 36-57 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties posed by
the two-prong Grable test).
78. Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2367.
79. Some of the language of Grable supports this conclusion. After discussing the
federal interest in providing a forum for Grable's quiet title claim, the Court-presumably,
but not expressly, moving on to the second prong of the test it articulated earlier in the
opinion-noted that "federal jurisdiction to resolve genuine disagreement over federal tax
title provisions will portend only a microscopic effect on the federal-state division of
labor." Id. at 2368.
80. 177 U.S. 505 (1900).
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Act of 1875."81 Shoshone involved a dispute over mining rights in
which the cause of action was created by a federal statute stating that
disputes over mining rights could be resolved "in a court of
competent jurisdiction ' 82 by reference to local customs of miners.83 In
spite of the fact that federal law created the cause of action, the Court
found jurisdiction lacking in part because the dispute could be
resolved by reference to local standards alone, thus eliminating the
need to interpret federal law.'4 Furthermore, the Court recognized
that not every case involving a federally created land right could be
adjudicated in the federal system.85
The same concerns for the federal docket that appear to have
motivated the Shoshone decision find some empirical support in the
context of modern civil litigation in the federal courts. As Judge
Posner has noted, between 1960 and 1983 the number of "pure civil
cases" filed in federal district courts increased "more than 330
percent. '86  The Grable Court's discussion of the burden on the
federal courts that exercising jurisdiction would have posed in Merrell
Dow as compared to Grable itself8 7 was thus not a shocking-or even
surprising-move.
Pragmatic judgments to exercise or refrain from exercising
jurisdiction will have implications beyond the individual case.88 As
Professor Cohen pointed out in 1967, "the process is not simply case-
by-case decision making, with each case standing on its own bottom,
but rather a process of clarifying jurisdictional uncertainty in classes
of cases before the court."89 This view of individual jurisdictional
decisions as affecting classes of cases provides the basis for the fear
81. Cohen, supra note 45, at 903; see also Shapiro, supra note 76, at 570 (noting that
"[c]ases like Shoshone must have arisen with monotonous regularity at the turn of the
century, but the degree of federal interest in an outcome dependent on local custom was
marginal at best").
82. Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 506.
83. Id. at 508.
84. See id. at 508-09 ("The recognition by Congress of local customs and statutory
provisions as at times controlling the right of possession does not incorporate them into
the body of federal law.").
85. Id. at 513. The Grable Court pointed to Shoshone as "an extremely rare exception
to the sufficiency of a federal right of action." Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue
Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2370 n.5. (2005).
86. POSNER, supra note 70, at 59.
87. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
88. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 908-09 ("[N]o matter how close the pragmatic
judgment in a particular case, once made it is bound to decide more than just the case
before the court.").
89. Id. at 908-10. For Professor Cohen, this clarifying effect was one of the great
benefits of pragmatic decisionmaking. See id.
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that exercising jurisdiction over a single plaintiff's hybrid claim could
potentially overwhelm the courts with similar claims.
At least one commentator in the period between Merrell Dow
and Grable suggested that the problems posed by Merrell Dow's
remedy-focused formulation of the test for § 1331 jurisdiction could
be resolved by reference to pragmatic factors, including the potential
effect on the federal docket of exercising jurisdiction in a particular
case.' The notion that federal courts should have fairly broad
discretion in the decision to exercise jurisdiction receives significant
support in literature about the federal courts,9 but it is by no means
universally accepted. Professor Redish, for one, has expressly and
emphatically disavowed the validity of "the interest in avoiding undue
congestion of the federal court dockets" in jurisdictional decisions. 2
Given the vagueness of the language of § 1331 and the role of the
district courts as front-line arbiters of jurisdictional questions, the
statute necessarily confers some discretionary power on the district
courts. It is the amount and nature of this discretionary power that
90. See Marshall, supra note 3, at 241 (arguing that "[p]ragmatic considerations should
form the crux of the jurisdictional analysis in state-federal hybrid claims" and noting that
"concern is warranted over the potential for overwhelming the federal docket if courts
obtain original jurisdiction over a class of claims"); see also Luneburg, supra note 39, at
769-70 (discussing the role that concerns for docket load may have played in the Merrell
Dow decision).
91. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 76, at 545 (arguing that judicial discretion in
jurisdictional decisionmaking "is wholly consistent with the Anglo-American legal
tradition"); see also Alleva, supra note 2, at 1481-82 (noting that the Supreme Court has
given federal district courts "considerable discretion within the broader congressional
directive to determine the jurisdictional sufficiency of hybrid actions").
92. Redish, supra note 21, at 1785-86. In Professor Redish's view,
[t]he federal courts do not exist for the purpose of clearing their dockets. They
exist to unify the federal system, to interpret and enforce federal law, and to
prevent interstate prejudices and allegiances from balkanizing the nation. If the
commitment of significant resources is required to accomplish this goal, then so be
it.
Id. at 1786.
The dissenters in Merrell Dow also weighed in on this issue, arguing that "while
the increased volume of litigation may appropriately be considered in connection with
reasoned arguments that justify limiting the reach of § 1331, .. . the day has [not] yet
arrived when this Court may trim a statute solely because it thinks that Congress made it
too broad." Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 829 (1986) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). A resolution of this broader issue-whether caseload factors should have a
place in jurisdictional decisions-is beyond the scope of this Recent Development, which
accepts, as a matter of positive law, that caseload factors do have a place in jurisdictional
decisions after Grable.
Yet another commentator has suggested that judicial discretion in jurisdictional
decisions often ends up wasting time and money. See Note, supra note 22, at 2279-80.
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causes disagreement among scholars. Regardless of one's opinion on
the normative issue of whether caseload factors should play a role in
jurisdictional decisions, the positive law on this point is clear. Grable
grants district courts deciding cases on the fringes of § 1331 discretion
to consider the burdens on the federal docket that might result from
exercising jurisdiction over a class of cases like the one at bar.
Application of the Grable balancing test in two pre-Merrell Dow
cases-Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.9 3 and Moore v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.94-shows that this pragmatic
balancing test could produce consistent jurisdictional results in even
the most difficult hybrid claim cases.95
Smith involved a shareholder's suit to prevent a bank from
investing in bonds issued under the Federal Farm Loan Act.96 The
plaintiff alleged that the loan act authorizing the bonds was
unconstitutional. 97 The Federal Farm Loan Act was a complicated
statute providing for the creation of Federal Land Banks, which
issued loans for the purchase of farm lands.98 The Act also authorized
Federal Land Banks to sell bonds and make interest from these bonds
exempt from federal, state, and local taxation.99 The plaintiffs alleged
that Congress lacked power to create the Federal Land Banks and
exempt the banks' bonds from taxation."°  The Supreme Court,
raising the jurisdictional question sua sponte,101 determined that
jurisdiction was proper because any decision in the case depended on
the determination of the constitutional validity of a federal statute.102
In Moore, a railroad employee sued his employer under the
Kentucky Employers' Liability Act for injuries allegedly caused by
defective equipment.103  The Kentucky statute incorporated by
93. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
94. 291 U.S. 205 (1934).
95. The majority in Merrell Dow noted that the "widely perceived 'irreconcilable'
conflict" between the outcomes in Smith and Moore could be understood by reference to
the "nature of the federal issues at stake." See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 n.12. The
dissenters conceded that such an analysis could reconcile the two cases, but "only because
a test based upon an ad hoc evaluation of the importance of the federal issue is infinitely
malleable." See id. at 822 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. Smith, 255 U.S. at 195; see Federal Farm Loan Act, Pub. L. No. 64-158, 39 Stat.
360 (1916).
97. Smith, 255 U.S. at 195.
98. See id. at 202-03.
99. See id. at 207.
100. See id. at 198.
101. See id. at 199 ("No objection is made to the federal jurisdiction, either original or
appellate, by the parties to this suit, but that question will be first examined.").
102. See id. at 201.
103. See Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205,207-08 (1934).
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reference the terms of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts.'M Under
the Kentucky statute, a violation of the standards set forth in the
federal safety laws constituted negligence per se and eliminated the
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk." The
Supreme Court found federal question jurisdiction lacking, relying on
the fact that the plaintiff's suit was in essence a state-law tort action.10
6
The difference in the federal interest in adjudicating the two
cases is apparent from the bare fact that the plaintiff in Smith asked
the court to strike down a federal statute as unconstitutional 7 while
the plaintiff in Moore merely asked the court to find that a private
party had violated a duty imposed by a federal statute. 10 8 It is also
readily apparent that opening the door of the federal courthouse to
the class of claims represented by Moore-state tort actions
incorporating a duty imposed on employers by federal law-could
result in a significant increase in federal cases."° The class of claims
represented by the Smith case, on the other hand, is likely to be
relatively small," including only those cases where the constitutional
validity of an act of Congress is directly challenged, with that
constitutional challenge serving as the primary basis for the plaintiff's
claim. Furthermore, once decided, Smith would determine the
constitutionality of the Federal Farm Loan Act for good,"' while
cases like Moore could recur indefinitely, with courts refining and
revising the scope of an employer's duty under the Federal Safety
104. Id. at 213.
105. See id. The plaintiff in Moore also alleged a violation of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. Id. at 208. The Federal Employers' Liability Act, like the Kentucky act,
incorporated the standards of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts. Id. at 210.
106. See id. at 216-17. Notably, the Court sustained jurisdiction over this same claim
on diversity grounds, and sustained jurisdiction over a second claim under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act on federal question grounds. See id. at 210-11.
107. See Smith, 255 U.S. at 195.
108. See Moore, 291 U.S. at 207-08.
109. See, e.g., 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.6 (2d ed. 1986)
(noting "the ever-growing number of regulatory statutes that are drawn into accident
litigation" to establish tort liability). This is precisely the point the Grable Court made
about Merrell Dow. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S.
Ct. 2363, 2370 (2005) ("[E]xercising federal jurisdiction over a state misbranding action
would have attracted a horde of original filings and removal cases raising other state
claims with embedded federal issues.").
110. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 906 (noting that "there is little reason to fear that the
sustaining of jurisdiction in [the] class of litigation [represented by Smith] would add
significantly to the workload of an overburdened federal judiciary").
111. See Note, supra note 22, at 2288 (noting that a decision on the constitutionality of
the Act would determine " 'the continued vitality of the statute'" (quoting Arther R.




Appliance Acts. Thus, the pragmatic caseload factor would weigh
strongly against the federal interest in providing a forum in Moore,
while in Smith, the federal interest in providing a forum would easily
outweigh the potential burden on the federal docket caused by filings
of similar cases.
In most federal cases where subject matter jurisdiction is
grounded on § 1331, federal law creates the cause of action, and
disposes of the jurisdictional question with relative ease.112 Close
cases presenting mixed issues of state and federal law, however, force
district courts to confront a confusing line of cases in which the
Supreme Court's attempts to articulate an all-purpose, bright-line test
for the § 1331 inquiry have consistently failed. Grable's two-prong
test, with its misleading instruction to conform jurisdictional decisions
to congressional intent regarding the division of labor between state
and federal courts,113 does not advance the state of the law in this
area. Fortunately, the Court's reconciliation of its holdings in Grable
and Merrell Dow offers an example of the kind of functional,
pragmatic analysis that can lead to consistent and intelligible
jurisdictional results in difficult hybrid claim cases.'14  Grable's
balancing test, by pitting the federal interest in providing a forum
against the risk of overwhelming the federal docket, provides district
courts with the proper measure of guidance and discretion necessary
to allow realization of the goals of federal question jurisdiction.
ADAM P.M. TARLETON
112. See, e.g., Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2366 (noting that § 1331 "is invoked by and large by
plaintiffs pleading a cause of action created by federal law"); see also Cohen, supra note
45, at 905-06 ("The bulk of federal civil litigation in the federal courts presents no
jurisdictional problem. Routine federal question litigation arises under federal statutes
which not only create federal causes of action but contain special grants of jurisdiction as
well.").
113. See Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2368.
114. See id. at 2369-71.
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